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DEDICATION

I have stolen time from my wife and son to pursue

a dream. This debt I cannot repay, and so, offer my work
to them.
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ABSTRACT

Paradigms offer different perspectives of reality
and therefore manipulate facts to accentuate some issues

and take away from others. Until recently, the dominate

Realist paradigm held sway by explaining international

relations in terms of garnering and distributing power.
The paradigm contends domestic polity and ethics are
I

■

■,

separate and distinct from global conditions. This notion

reinforced and rationalized colonial struggles and
imperialist methods of control. Transnationalism is

currently challenging Rationalism's dominance by offering
a world that is more complex than just the drive for
national security. According to Transnationalism

nation-state politics are influenced by non-state actors,
individuals and increased state integration.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Role of Paradigms

According to Thomas Kuhn a paradigm relates to

"research firmly based upon one or more past scientific
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific
community acknowledges for a time as supplying the

foundation for its practice".

Paradigms then are the set

of beliefs, concepts, theories, methods and instruments

that help guide scientific communities to truth testing
data, selection of hypotheses and advocating one theory
over another.

In short a paradigm is an intellectual

framework that structures one's thinking about a set of

phenomena.^
Kuhn argues that paradigms are impacted by four phases.

The first, is the preparadigmic phase in which there is
no dominate or overwhelming approach that is agreed on

by the scientific community. The second is the paradigmic
phase which occurs when the body of community subscribes
to a dominate paradigm. The third phase, and one which

concerns this study, is the "crisis phase". During this

phase challenges and revision to the dominate paradigm
transpire and new paradigms appear and old ones are revived,

The fourth and final phase is the phase of scientific
revolution which takes place when the community exchanges

one paradigm for another. This study attempts to confirm
Kuhn's view that paradigms are transitory and that the

third phase is presently occurring among practitioners
4

of political science.

Paradigms offer different perspectives of reality
and therefore manipulate facts to accentuate some issues

and take away from others. There have been four major
paradigms that have shaped the discipline of international
relations in the 20th century: the Idealist paradigm, the

Marxist paradigm, the Realist paradigm, and the
Transnationalist paradigm. These paradigms are of

significant importance to the study of international affairs
because governments have operationalized them to construct

policy. While this study focuses on Realism and
Transnationalism, Idealism and Marxism are worthy of note
and will be discussed below for the purpose of lending
theoretical continuity to this study.

The Idealist Paradigm

According to Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, Idealism
is also referred to as "Liberalism" in international

relations and, as a paradigm, stresses international law
5

and moral values.

Thus, Idealism concerns itself with

how the world ought to be as opposed to how it has been

and contends that a "harmony of interests" should guide
issues of foreign policy rather than national interest,
power and state survival.

Practitioners of Idealism were attacked by E.H. Carr

in his pivotal work The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939:
An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,
for their propensity to ignore what was and indulge in

wishful thinking.^ As a result of the Idealist focus on
the abstract they were unable to comprehend nor control

events during the paradigm's zenith between World War I
and World War II. According to Carr, Idealists such as

Woodrow Wilson, Arnold Toynbee, Norman Angell and Alfred
Zimmern, failed to recognize that nation state behavior
was directly related to national interest and power as

opposed to universal mores.

Thus foreign policies based

on good will and disarmament were naturally doomed to
failure because "these supposedly absolute and universal

principles were not principles at all but the unconscious
reflections of national policy based on a particular

interpretation of national interest at a particular time."
While Carr was correct in identifying the Idealist approach

as taking place between the early 1900*s and 1940*s, this
school of thought was rooted in earlier philosophies.

Indeed, John Lock, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant
and John Stuart Mill are considered to be Idealists since

they all asserted that conscience and reason are both
9

paramount in achieving world peace and harmony.

example of Kuhn's crisis phase. Idealism

In an

was superseded

by the Realist paradigm during the 1950's because the former

was discredited in part by the inability of the League
of Nations to prevent World War II.

The Marxist Paradigm

It is very difficult to illuminate a Marxist theory
of international relations since Karl Marx died prior to

constructing an explicit theory on international relations.
A John Atkinson Hobson contributed to the construction

in Marxist theory in his notable work on imperialism in

1902. Hobson argued that British imperialism was the result
9

of surplus capital and diminishing returns at home.

Therefore, rather than increase local wages industrialists
expanded their markets--often forcefully— into foreign
lands. Thus British imperialism "was directly linked to

overseas investments".^® Rudolf Hilferding continued the
Marxian tradition by incorporating Hobson*s work into Marx's
11

theory of historical materialism.

Lenin added to these

works in his now famous imperialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism in 191 6.

Lenin held that imperialism was the final dying stage

of capitalism which contained five essential features:
(1) the concentration of production by the few which intern

created monopolies; (2) an oligarchy was formed by the
fusion of banking and industrial capital; (3) capital is

exported from impoverished nation states; (4) the world
" 5

has been shared by international capitalists; and (5) the

earth is divided by the greatest capitalist powers.
Although there is no specific Communist approach to

international relations we can, by combining Lenin's works

along with those found in Marx's Das Kapital, safely outline
the Marxist paradigm as follows:

1. All history is the history of class struggle
between a ruling group and an opposing group.

2. Capitalism gives rise to antagonistic classes,
the bourgeoisie and proletariat, with bourgeoisie
control.

3. Capitalism uses war to further its own ends.

4. Socialism, which destroys classes, must also
destroy war.

5. Once the state has withered away, so too must
international relations.

In sum, the Marxist paradigm argues that economies dictated
the establishment and maintenance of the state. Once the

accumulation of private capital, which was held in the

hands of a few, was transferred, and held collectively
by the many via a world wide revolution, there would be

global harmony and the state would disappear. This paradigm
as practiced by the Soviets and East Europeans has failed.
One could argue that Marxism never truly existed in those

otherwise"Communist" states therefore the paradigm has
not been sufficiently tested.

Setting the Analytical Framework

Consistent with Kuhn's paradigmatic phase, and as
a result of certain analytical weaknesses and practical
failings of both the Marxist and Idealist paradigms, the
Realist and Transnationlist perspectives took on a more
elevated status. However, I believe that contemporary

Realism is an extension of, if not a refinement of
colonialist policies. Therefore chapter two concentrates

on the legacy of colonialism and its impact on international
relations as expressed in Realism. The purpose of this

chapter, then, is to demonstrate that the world which was
born of Machiavellian principles and expressed later in

Realist theory is slowly changing. Indeed, there are
alternatives to the often inflexible doctrines associated

with Realism. Realists are often eager to point out that
the present state of international confusion or

confrontation is justification of their theory. However,
I contend that this is a reaction to Realism likened to

the rattling of the egg prior to the Phoenix. This chapter
is dedicated to an elaboration of the specific weakness

of the Realist paradigm. In summary, it can argued with
some confidence that the discipliri e of international

relations has generally, and Western foreign policy
specifically, has been influenced by certain Machiavellian

principles of power which have formed the philosophical

bases of the Realist paradigm. The relative "correctness"
or weakness of International Relation's theories and

practices must, then, be addressed through an objective
analysis of the Realist paradigm.
The Realist model, which came to dominate international
relations theory in the West, is the subject of the third

chapter of this study. In an effort to illuminate the
positions and elements pertaining to the Realist paradigm

the chapter draws on the major works of Realists Hans
Morgenthau, Hedly Bull, Klaus Knorr, Kenneth Waltz, Edward

L. Morse and Rienhold Neibuhr.

Basically, Realism can

be summarized as the struggle for power. Realists argue

that states seek security in an otherwise hostile and

anarchical world. Thus a state's international policy is
determined and reinforced by the drive for power in order

to guarantee the survivability of the state. The dominate
states tend to be more conservative and support policies
that maintain the status quo, while subordinate states

expressing their dissatisfaction, become more

expansionistic. The result is that alliances are made and
broken and friends become enemies in the quest for national

security. Accordingly, universal principles of morality

do not apply within the sphere of international relations.
Realists contend like Machiavelli writing in the sixteenth

century and Thomas Hobbs writing a century later, that
is necessary for leaders to have a different set of morals
8

for governing in an anarchical world.

In contrast to the long established Realist view,
the, forth chapter of this work turns to the Transnationalist
paradigm* Drawing on Kuhn's notion of scientific

revolution--and because Transnationalism will be considered

as a challenge to the predominate paradigm—there are some
general rules of analysis that must be followed if a rival

paradigm is to gain aeceptance in the academic community.
According to Imre Lakatos the contending paradigm must:

"(1 ) explain everything the old theory explained, (2)
explain at least part of what the old theory failed to
explain, and (3) have some explanations under and
empirically corroborated by research.

Because In the

spirit of offering an alternative, Transnationalism is

more complex and posits more elements than Realism, this

chapter will provide additional information and in greater
depth than the chapter on Realism.
Transnationalism contends that the world of

international politics is more complex than states being
driven by the need for national security. Theorists such
as James Rosenau, Richard Falk, Joseph Nye and Robert

Keohane posit that other non-state actors, aside from the

military, diplomats, and official policy makers also

influence the international polity. Transnationalists argue
that international relations are becoming increasingly
16

more integrated.

They claim that separate national

entities which have political and economic power are merging
into supranational authorities such as the European

Community. Although this process is slow, multi-layered,
and tends to grow in spurts, many scholars contend that

the merging of economies is usually the first step toward
17

greater interdependence.

Accordingly, Transnational

integration occurs undei: the influence of many different
variables which hasten or impede the process. For example,

integration of militaries is made easier under the threat
of war, such as in the establishment of NATO, while
recessions reduce the likelihood of merging economies.

James Rosenau identifies these variables as "environments"
which he classifies as contiguous, regional, cold war,

racial, resource, and organizational. Thus, in around about

way, chapter two seeks to build upon Rosenau's thesis by
contributing an additional environment the colonial legacy.
The bhsic premise of this paper focuses on the idea
that increased integration and cohesion, as illustrated

by the Transnationalist paradigm, is leading the world
to a brighter future while at the same time the persistent

behavior related to the memory and/or extension of colonial

policies often thwart efforts of integration. By studying
Colonialism, Realism, and Transnationalism the arena of

world politics can be seen with greater comprehension and
the actual transition from one paradigm to another might
be eased.

10

We now turn our attention to a discussion of

Colonialism and its relevance to the study of Realism and
Transnationalism.

11

CHAPTER TWO
THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

12

The colonial legacy has a greater role to play in
contemporary political affairs and subsequent theory

building than is currently addressed in Western literature.
That is, the colonial experience has left a lingering impact

on the politics, economics and psychological make up of
1

the Third World countries.

As Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner

suggests, these effects have lingered because of the length
and intensity of the colonial experience.

Thus, the

rearrangement of Third World power, the redefinition of
national borders, and associated conflicts will continue

for some time and may not end until they finally arrive

at a point of indigenous geographic and Social equilibrium

rather than one imposed upon the land and people by colonial
design.

Indeed, most interstate confrontation that has occurred

in the last forty years has been between underdeveloped
countries (UDCVs).While there are, quantitatively, more
UDC's than developed countries, Braveboy asserts that
"these countries exhibit a proportionally higher level

of both verbal and physical conflict behavior."

Therefore,

one might conclude that there must be some shared factors
between the states which can be directly attributed to

the high frequency of social unrest, revolutions and wars

among them.^ It has been suggested that conflict in the
underdeveloped wOrld can be sorted into patterns of national

development including: "confrontations as anti-colonial
13

conflict, territorial disputes, irredentist conflicts and

class agitation involving subgroup nationalism" and second,
5

the impact of modernization.

This section of the thesis draws on the Braveboy

hypothesis and will attempt to underscore its strengths
by outlining the broad historical trends and conditions
that have influenced UDC political growth. This will be
accomplished by: (1) defining colonialism; (2) illuminating

methods of suppression used by imperialists; (3) examining
the effects of colonialism on UDC's; (4) surveying

the

UDC's responses to colonialism; (5) exploring origins of
racism and (6) concluding observations.

Colonialism and Imperialism: Questions of Definition

Bruce Wetteran defines colonialism as a "policy or

program by which a state seeks political or economic control
over other territories."

Concomitantly Harry Ritter defines

imperialism as "the expansion of a state beyond its own
frontiers with the aim of dominating other states or

societies."^ Due to the similarity of domination by one
state over another within these definitions and others

examined, there appears to be no difference in practice,
between colonialism and imperialism. If there is difference
to be found it is not in the actual effects but rather

rooted in historical distortions or in the semantics of
14

th© aggressive foirces. For example/ when Ameiricans consideir
the term 'Golonialist' it brings back moments of national

glory rooted in the early foundations of the Plymouth and
Jamestown colonies, and later the Revolutionary War; it
does not focus on the slaughter of the indigenous

inhabitants. Therefore, colonization in America carries

the romantic image of forging a new nation as opposed to
the contrasting view of domination which is held through
out the Third World. Concomitantly, William Appleman
Williams contends that Americans hold the principle of

self-determination in high esteem while imperialism has,

over time, become seen as a negative element by freedom

loving Americans.^ This distinction surprises many
individuals in the Third World who see the open door

policy—the notion that American moral and ideological
expansion would promote democracy and curtail world
9

unrest—as a clear case of American imperialism.

In

addition, the expansion of developed economies have made

it nearly impossible for other underdeveloped countries
to achieve economic independence, and its logical extension,

political independence. This sequence of events is seen
by many in the underdeveloped nations as yet another form

of imperialism and while denied by the developed nations,
this schism continues and further complicates any hope

of establishing definitional clarity between colonialism

and imperialism. However, if we were to make any distinction

15

between the two terms we might argue for imperialism being
the tools used by the colonialists.

COLONIALISM

Colonialism has a long history, spanning over 400

years, encompassing nine percent of the earth's surface
by 1492, and expanding to include eighty-five percent of

the globe by 1935. During those 400 hundred years
colonialism passed through three periods.

The first expression of early colonialism was
mercantilism.

With mercantilism European monarchies saw

their economies as a zero sum. That is, any flow of goods
or services outside the realm weakened the nation.

Therefore the European powers felt compelled to expand
their economies by licensing companies to gather raw
materials from foreign lands and returning them to the
homeland where factories turned them into finished products.

To safeguard their investment the Europeans built a series
of military complexes.

Neo-Mercantism was the second period of colonialism,
and lasted from the 1700's until 1890. During this period

Europeans increased their dominions. To pay for the

expansion, two methods of economic extraction were used:
(1) tribute, either direGtly through taxation or indirectly
16

through a captive market for home based goods; and (2)
slavery.

The third period occurred from 1890 to the middle
of the 20th Century. There was a dramatic rise in the

conquest of unexplored territory based on anticipated
economic gain which subsequently effected the European

balance of power. Unique to this phase was a change in

the style of domination. Unlike the periods listed above,
entire governments were not taken over but became

protectorates. Protectorates were allowed to carry some
semblance of traditional control while subservient
authorities were actually irtanipulated for European

interests.^® This phase is often referred as economic
11 "

imperialism.

Influenced by the work of Karl Marx, John Atkinson

Hobson, who wrote the notable work Imperialism in 1902,
contended that British imperialism was the result of surplus
12

capital and diminishing returns at home.

Therefore, rather

than increase local wages industrialists expanded their
markets— often forcefully— into foreign lands. Thus

British imperialism was "directly linked to overseas

investments."^^ While Karl Marx died prior to constructing
an explicit theory on the economic aspects of imperialism,
Rudolf Hilferding continued in the Marxian tradition by

incorporating Hobson's work into Marx's theory of historical
materialism. Lenin added to these works in his now famous
17

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916.
Lenin held that imperialism was the final dying stage

of capitalism and as such it contained five essential
features;

(1) The concentration of production and capital
developed so highly that it creates monopolies
which play a decisive role in economic life.
(2) The fusion of banking capital with industrial
capital and the creation, on the basis of this
financial capital of a financial oligarchy
(3) The export of capital, which has become

extremely important as distinguished from the
export of commodities.

(4) The formation of the international capitalist
monopolies which share out the world among
themselves.

(5) The territorial division of the whole eajjr^h
completed by the greatest capitalist powers.
According to Rene' Maunier (1949), imperialism takes

four forms: spiritual, power, material and cultural. By

using his framework we can examine the various tools of
colonialism.

First, Maunier argues that "spiritual imperialism
is domination of the religious nature. Spiritual or

religious imperialism is the first phase of all colonial

imperialism".^^ Religion has the unique ability to motivate
its proponents and champions by both fear and hope. In
the case of conquest, crusader minset, that of moral

obligation, is the rationalization behind religious
domination. That is, by not suppressing the anti-Christ
veiws of the heathen, the conqueror perpetuates evil and
18

indirectly transfers the blame onto himself for neglecting
his duty. Thus justifing his agressive actions. Moreover,

religious fear protects the champion from accruing lists
of sin by allowing them to reduce their crimes through

the destruction of evil and thus receiving absolution.
The crusader motivation also perpetuates the myth

that the dominating religious believers are possessed by
a deity and are therefore superior to non-believers.

Needless to say, those members of the dominant "superior"
faith are hostile to all others outside their religion.

Because the "native" believes in a 'false god,' the result
16

is either extermination or forced assimilation.

While

extermination is at best inhumane, assimilation through

conversion subjects the converted to long term racial and

cultural contempt by those who see their role as one of
raising or uplifting the heathen.

Maunier claims that spiritual imperialism contains
17

"two constant features: duty and domination."

Of these

factors, the duty to save men's souls is the fundamental
difference between spiritual imperialism and all other

types of imperialism. As a corollary of salvation, it can
be convincingly argued that, at one /time or another, most
of the world's religions have relied upon violence as their
chosen method to impose their teachings rather than cerebral
persuasion (See Figure 2.1).
Religious missions have been effectively used by
19

Figure 2.1

Relationship of Colonialism to Imperialism

COLONIALISM

Imperialistic Tools

Economic Investments

Spiritual
COLONIALISM

Power

COLONIALISM

Material
Cultural

Divide and Rule
Indirect Divide and Rule

COLONIALISM

All colonial nations are imperialistic but degrees of

domination may vary. Likewlsef nations can use the tools
of Imperialism without being colonial.
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regimes to suppress indigenous peoples. This is because
missionaries are generally transplanted from the home

country and upon entering into a 'backward' society the
infusion of their religious principles destroys the social
matrix of the traditional culture. Because missionaries

received state support/ tacit or otherwise, when rebellion

seemed imminent they reciprocated by proclaiming the revolt
as an act against God, and effectively reduced the

indigenous peoples' psychological advantage of having God
on their side. On the other hand, religion can act as a

unifying force behind revolutions by helping revolutionaries
galvanize support behind a single issue.

Accordingly,

"all through Asia and Africa the imperial governments were
identified as Christian and hostility to these governments

was transferred to their religion."^® According to Braveboy,
anti-Christian sentiment was easily introduced among

indigenous peoples because of the discrepancy between
Christian teachings and actual colonial behavior. Therefore

Christianity became nativized or, conversely, traditional
religions and cultures became strengthened. The focus on
traditional religions became a rallying point used by many
nationalistic leaders to foster group cohesion and build

up 'home' appeal. Having learned their lessons well, some
former colonies now find it to their advantage to portray

the enemies of the state as enemies of God. Indeed, the

linkage between religious hierarchical status and national
21

leadership in many states is inseparable.
The second form, "power-imperialism is, in a word,
19

the wish to dominate for the sake of dominating."

This

element can be seen throughout recorded time as societies

experience an upsurge in the level of nationalism. Because
of the quantitative increase in nationalism and its
transmission into force, Maunier believes that the joy
20

of force itself becomes a good.

For power imperialism

to arise, racial primacy and cultural superiority must

be a publicly held ideology. Thus, due to a collective
and a reverent sense of primal superiority, the group seeks

to reaffirm its greatness through the search for glory.

Therefore, group superiority or 'primacy* gives power
imperialism its dimension to alter, rule, convert or to
enslave. Pivotal to group primacy is its foundation in

mystical beliefs. For example, the dogma of being a son
of God has led individuals to think that they are chosen

among men to lead mankind or, at maximum, they follow the

fallacy to the conclusion that they too are gods. Ultimately
this mystical primacy in the western world led to the
fallacious racial doctrine of Albinism or the superiority
of the white man.

The third form in Maunier's theoretical construct

is, "material imperialism" which is based on self-interest
rather than spiritual, cultural, or power primacy. Simply

put, it is the acquisition of booty and tribute taken away
22

from the colonies and transferred to the motherland where

luxury goods are produced for the wealthy elite and the
petty bourgeois. There were two ways in which nation-states
increased their national wealth during most of the colonial

period: either through tribute or profit. Tribute includes
direct taxation or indirect taxation such as the high cost

associated with the importation of finished goods from
the home county. In order to exact the latter form of

tribute, most colonies were restricted to products
manufactured in the motherland. By law, this greatly

increased profits at home thus the extension of export
tribute, both in terms of increased markets and home
industrial growth, reinforced the domination of larger
land masses, better trade routes and the suppression of
colonial industrial growth.
Yet another factor behind material imperialism is

the transplantation or settlement of colonies with excess

members of the motherland's population. "If a state is
suffering from having too many citizens, you must make
21

your choice; either produce more food or emigrate."

If,

however, the nation is unable to produce more food on
available lands, it was forced into importing goods which
at that time led to need for conquest.

Maunier's fourth and final form, "cultural

imperialism," lays claim to territory based on the

superiority of the conqueror's civilization. Cultural
23,

imperialism is not a new phenomena and is probably related
to notion of tribalistic primacy. Maunier believes that
cultural imperialism contains two reinforcing elements
22

those of feelings and judgement.

Feelings lend support for the concept of national
superiority and the concomitant contempt for the inferior.
"When you despise the foreigner (native) you are led to
wish to re-^mold him"...."which leads to the idea that this
23

inferior can be, and ought to be, civilized."

This

judgment provides yet another rationalization to rule.

Thus the ihdiginous peoples became linked to the perception
of development. By casting the natives as savages, at the

bottom of development, of as barbarians (not quite savages
but could be civilized With a little help), increased
intervention and ultimate domination was butressed.

A question then arises concerning the desirability
of assimilation as a method of conquests I believe that

this method of conquest-- particularly for the French who

viewed being French the best thing they could do for you—
was rooted in the philosophy of the times. Between the

late 1800's and early 1900's the colonialists believed
that they had a moral obligation as civilized people to

force the subjugated to accept the Western ideology of
progress and rule of law. This meant the abolition of some
local customs and laws. These changes were buttressed in

later colonialism by the imposition of education and
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constant persuasion.
A factor that Maunier does not address is the relative

ease in which racism transcends socioeconomic development

as the primary factor for labeling individuals as savages

and making skin color the paramount criterion. Louis Snyder
argues that "racialism" is a recent phenomena and is the
direct result of modern nationalism and imperialism. He

contends that prior to the 16th century antagonisms between

people were based on "cultural, religious and linguistic

differences."^^ Racial differences were noticed as an
indirect result of the colonial neo-mercantilist class.

It is believed that white Europeans became increasingly
aware of their racial differences while subjugating black,

brown and red men.^^ In the spirit of Sir Charles Dilke,
who argued that "the gradual extinction of inferior races
is not only a law of nature but a blessing to mankind",
the 19th century the British began to see themselves as
racial saviors of the world.

The myths that gave rise

to racial primacy were the mystical relationship to the
teutonic peoples and later. Social Darwinism. Social
Darwinism as a theory suggested that social systems were

governed by survival of the fittest both in terms of health
and development. Therefore, the weaker races would
eventually be replaced by the stronger and more efficient
ones.

The British were not the only nation to focus on
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cultural primacy. The French had believed in their racial
and cultural superiority. Indeed, they set their mystic
national identity on somatic and psychic characteristics.

Not to be out done, the Americans joined into the fray.
Senator Albert Beveridge a conservative Republican from

Indiana, in making the case for American annexation of
the Philippines in 1900, claimed that we should not abandon
the Orient because to do so would be to abandon the mission

of our "race, trustee, under God ,the civilization of the
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world."

Hence, the paternal nonsense of "our little brown

brother."

These racist theories culminated in the popular

supremacist belief that the other races were "the white
man's burden", and that the Anglo-Saxon males had an
obligation to "the weak, black races, the same sort of
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obligation owed to women, children and dumb animals."

Thus, race further legitimized European and American rule

and influence and gave order to societies based on racial
stratification. To support their divine right to rule

Westerners put on the air of being "God-like themselves
in the eyes of the natives. And if not quite God-like,
then at least in the relationship of masters to servants
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or, a common theme, parents to children."

One of the

more successful tools used by colonial powers to suppress

indigenous self-rule took advantage of the divisive
properties found in racisni itself and the sense of cultural
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superiority. The tool is known as divide and rule.
Divide and rule was an instrument of domination and

consisted in two forms: First, there was the

political division of linguistic groups into various smaller
units and then, the reassemblage of them into larger groups

that spoke different languages so that collusion against

the oppressor was made difficult. Secondly, old rivalries
among indigenous peoples were rekindled which further
divided the region into smaller units. Fundamental to the
central thesis of this paper, is the notion that the
colonialists were activity involved in undermining

indiginous unity through divid and rule. As Gladwin
explains:

By administrative action, colonial officers isolate
separate cultural or linguistic groups which are
Competing for power or territory, or even encourage
such when it scarcely exists; sometimes pairs of
individual leaders of factions can be used in the

same way. Help is usually given to the weaker of
the two ,thus making the struggle even more intense.

By carefully controlling the amount of aid and
encouragement so that the two groups remain about
even and neither side can win, the energies of
both will be dissipated without any being left
over to combat the larger enemy.

Divide and rule was also accomplished indirectly.
Indirect rule occurred in administrative systems where

existing native chiefs implemented colonial policies at
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the village level rather than white colonial officers.
This form of rule used the remnants of the traditional

indigenous systems and, as such, needed to be implemented
27

immediately prior to the disintegration of that society.
Recruitment of local chiefs involved using a "combination

of pressure, perhaps threats, inducements and playing upon
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the chiefs sense of responsibility to his tribe."

Because

the indirect method deceptively responed to the demand
for local traditional control, it insured a reasonable

amount of safety for the foreign administrators. Even if
problems arose, native troops from elsewhere in the region
handled the unrest. The damage inflicted by this form of

rule had profound psychological and, later, political
effects.

Often indirect rule was established through a series

of treaties in which liguored chiefs signed away the control
of their lands to fbreign owned companies. In signing the

treaties, the chiefs pledged not to deal with any strangers

except the company and, in return, the company pledged

to protect the chiefs from outside attacks and not to change
the native laws or customs. But the chiefs did have to

submit to the company's demand of being a court of last

appealj a move that gave the company almost deity status.

Lastly, divide and rule takes its final form in the
arbitrary manner in which borders were drawn. Often the
colonial borders cut across tribal boundaries causing states

to be formed by combining cultures that were not compatible
with each other. This was done more often than not to

protect colonial realestate rather than human investment.
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As George Shepherd points out, "Almost every new nation
—and not a few old ones—is now more or less painfully
O O

hung on this kind of centrifuge."

Examples of but a

few states with diverse and hostile populations including:

(1) the Sudanese civil war between the light skinned Arab
northerners and the black non-Muslim southerners; (2)

engagements between the Kurds and Iran, Iraq and Turkey;
(3) the reamergence of Christian and Muslim struggles in
the Russian Federationn addition to the indiginous

separatists movements among the republics; and (4) the
divisions among light-skinned northerners and dark-skinned
southerners in India.

Isaacs contends that if we were

to examine further evidence of strife induced by the impact

of colonial boundaries on tribes and other groups we would

have to consider "Nigeria, the Congo, India in Assam and

Nagaland, Indonesia in Borneo, the Ethiopian-Somali-Kenyan
irredehtism,(and) the high permeability of the frontiers
of all the countries of the Indochina peninsula."

These

policies and the flagrant disregard for indigenous
boundaries adumbrate and act on the borders of many modern

nation states; states whose borders and future were designed
and sealed by colonial powers.
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THE EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM ON THE PRESENT NATION STATE
SYSTEM

Border Conflicts

As alluded to above/ nations, and often political

organizations, are based on divisions of the earth's
surface. In most cases these borders are represented by

geographic barriers such as lakes, mountains and rivers,
and sometimes these lines have been drawn irrespective

of cultures or linguistic groupings. Perhaps more cases

of homogenous societies being forced into heterogeneous
states are found on the continent of Africa than anywhere

else. Furthermore, Duchaek holds that when the Europeans

"were in the process of establishing their colonial empires
in Africa, they subdivided the whole continent arbitrarily

among themselves, usually proceeding from the coast into
the interior, and in doing so,they cut across all
traditional boundaries."

The General Act of the Berlin Conference held in 1885

is responsible for much of the face of modern Africa. Under
the Treaty, Europeans divided Africa into spheres of

influence which ultimately led to the creation of borders

for many modern nation states. The compact resolved and
established: (1) free trade among nations in the Congo

Basin; (2)the suppression of slave trade and slave markets;
(3) established neutrality for the territories of the Congo;
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(4) navigation on both the Congo and Niger rivers; and
(5) the rules for additional occupation of the coasts of
37
Africa.

By the end of 1917 the future of muslim lands in the
Middle East had been determined by European powers. The
first commitment was given by the British to Sharif Husayan

and his three sons. In the Husayan-McMahon correspondence

(1915-1916), the British agreed to divide up the Arabian

peninsula and reward Husayan for his help in defeating
the Ottoman Empire. The second, was the Sykes-Picot

(1915—1916) agreement, which divided the Ottoman Empire
between the British, French and Russians into spheres of

influence, while actual borders were drawn at the San Remo
conference in 1920. The first two agreements were made

in secret, but the future of the Middle East struggle was
sealed in 1917 by the British Balfour Declaration, which

in effect promised Palestine to the European Jewish Zionists
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as a national home.

When borders impdsed by foreign powers cut through

ethnic or tribal groups, two problems are produced. The
first conflict is irredentist, that is, a group's desire

to reunify with its ethnic counter part located within
I

the borders of another country. The second conflict involves

separatist elements that wish to succeed from the malformed
state and press their demands through civil unrest and
terrorism. Both the Kurds and the Armenians are good
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examples of both the irredentist and separatist mpvements.
The Kurds have fought to unify their tribal region, which
has been divided between Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The same
holds true for the Armenians who are separated by the
OQ

Turkish and Armenian borders.

The focus for Armenian

autonomy may be shifting since the struggle between
Armenians with Azeris has emerged within the Russian
Federation over Nagorno-Karabakh. Conversely, border

disputes help national leaders garner public support by
waving the flag of nationalism. The motive behind border

wars may be to shift the focus away from the real problem
and/or to unite factiohs behind new policies. Therefore,

most border disputes are placed on the back burner until
a dose of nationalism is called for. This is particularly
true where economics is involved and commodities are just
across the border (see table 2.1).

Aside from the principle of consent, state authority
is often the result of people being forced to recognize

the state's domination either through the state's
progressive use of force or through a power transfer. Thus,

"the existence of a political boundary is itself a major
contribution to a sense of solidarity. Among the most

important experiences that can unite a group is that they

share the same government."^® Although some nations share
the same languages and cultural heritage, if the divisions
between the states are externally imposed the divisions
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may harden into place and win general acceptance. For

example homogenous populations split and become new
political states, such as. North and South Korea, and Taiwan
and the Peoples Republic of China. Nevertheless, there

is the propensity for homogenous groups to reunite, such
as East and West Germany.

Racial strife

The existence of racism is an important element that

is frequently passed by Western scholars. Indeed, Middle
Eastern scholar Edward Said attacks the Western scholars

in his book Orientalism (1978) for not recognizing the
role of racism. He holds that this omission is rooted in

the perpetuation of European Imperialism. The study of

racism is also important because our modern world "took
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its political shape when racialism was at its height."
"It was, after all, well into this century, and not at

the height of Victorian imperial enthusiasm, that President

Franklin Roosevelt put forward his schemes for the
inter-breeding of European and Asian stock to produce a
less delinquent Asian race...
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Moreover, after WWII all

of the seventy-five newly formed nation states were

non-caucasoidi Hugh Tinker claims, "that today, transcending
everything (including the nuclear threat), there is the
confrontation between races.
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In f^ct, U.S. policies

TABLE 2.1

Some Territorial Disputes of Third World States

Postwar Disputes Involving Armed Conflict, with Years Begun—
Over creation of new states

India-Pakistan, 1947

India-Hyderabad, 1947

Arab States-Israel, 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973
Indonesia- Malaysia, 1963
Pakistan-Kashmir, 1965

India/Bangladesh-Pakistan, 1 971
Other

Eire-Northern Ireland, 1945

Afghanistan-Pakistan, 1950
Saudi Arabia-Abu Dhabi and Muscat, 1952
Cambodia-Thailand, 1953

China-India, 1954 (full-scale war 1962)
China-Burma, 1956

Nicaragua-Honduras, 1957
Egypt-Sudan, 1 958

Iraq-KUwait, 1962, 1 990^^
Morocco-Algeria, 1963
Somalia-Kenya, 1963

Somalia-Ethiopia, 1 963, 1 977^^
Argentina-Chile, 1963

Morocco (/Mauritania to 1978)- Western Sahara, 1976^
China-Vietnam, 1979, 1983^
Iran-Iraq, 1 980^^
Ecuador-Peru, 1981

Argentina-Britain/Falkland Islands, 1982
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TABLE 2.1
(continued)

Some Other Disputes/Claims

Iran, to Bahrain^
Somalia to Djibouti

Philippines, to Sabah (Malaysia)
Libya, to northwest Ghad
United Arab Emirates, to islands currently held by Iran

Bolivia, to a corridor to the sea through Chile
Argentina and Chile, to islands in the Beagle Channel
Venezuela and Colombia, to Gulf of Maracaibo
Venezuela, to two-thirds of Guyana

Nicaragua, to islands held by Colombia
Argentina and Chile (among others), to Antarctica

^ Data to 1971 are drawn from Evan Luard, ed.. The
International Regulation of Frontier Disputes (New York;

Praeger, 1970): 8-9.

^ Situations in which armed conflict is still
occurring.

Formally dropped in 1 970 but still occasionally noted,

From: Jaqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner Interpreting the Third
World: Politics, Economics and Social Issues, (New York:

Praeger, 1986) p. 102.
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have been partially impacted by the outbreak of tribal
and racial wars which have forced the Western nations to

make choices based on racial grounds in rather than the

rule of law. For example, the current suppression of the
Palestinian people is similar to that of the black South

Africans. Both of the combatants are baisically indiginous
peoples struggling against primarily European racial stock,

however the U.S. policy partially embargoes only the white

ruled apartheid. Some have observed that the policy probably
has more to do with pressure from America's large black
population than a commitment for social justice held by
our leaders.

Racism is an emotional attitude, a symptom of
insecurity, which transforms itself into a creed.

The

causes of racial prejudice are: (1) economic needs or

rivalries; (2) its manipulation by political leaders to
extend their own power; (3) social-cultural differences

between groups of people ; (4)an us versus them xenophobic
mentality; (5) religious differences that fester into racial

conflicts and (6) the physical traits of other peoples.
It is also important to include language in this category
since groups may share common customs, but distain anothers

language. An example of this linguistic form of prejudice
is presently occuring in Canada where the French speaking
Quebecois and English Canadians have long expressed
differences,sometimes violent, over the use, role and
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application of language in Canada.
Language plays an important role in determining the

way individuals and cultures perceive the world around
46

them through the use of description and idioms.

Language

can act as a hindrance to state unification, while on the

other hand, linguistic commonalities often forge closer
ties. Shared languages also tend to draw citizens of one
state closer to those in another state because, unlike
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others, they share something in common.

As Snyder points

out there are; however, several fallacies concerning

language and race: "{1)that language ties people together
with the same characteristics; (2) the ability to speak

the language represents a superior mental and physical
capabilities of the race; and (3) a language that is widely

spoken throughout the world reveals a higher level of
civilizing by those who speak it."

Most of these fallacies

were believed tq be true under Social Darwinism and can
still be found.

Modernization

I address the process of modernization because I think
that its effects on the social structure of the

underdeveloped world are largely the result of colonial

policies that have contributed to the suppression of local
industry and have inhibited access to Western technology.
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As I have noted, colonial policies were designed to maintain
economic dominance even after departure and, although these

policies are no longer directly enforced, they continue
to exert a certain degree of influence.

Social arid economic theorists have long thought that
as science advanced so too would mankind. But men are

advancing technologically while still retaining their
traditional social structures keyed to indiginous religous

and mystic belief systems. Moreover, much of the earth's
population has renewed its interest in re—tribalizing into
distinct ethno-linguistic blocks which has the effect of
further fragmenting states. Pivotal to this tribal
renaissance is the ayailability, use and application of

technology and mass communication. No other factor divides
the world like technology. It appears as though a small

percentage of the earth is pushing full tilt into the

technological age, with computers, tractors, and high speed
transportation, while others use yesterday's calculators,
bullock-drawn implements and inadequate transportation

systems. Still others, lost in confusion, remain aloof
and use evenmore primative levels of technology.

The problem with technology is particularly acute

in the developing world where rapid modernization is taking

place. Unlike industrialized states, where change has been
absorbed gradually and successfully over two-hundred years,
the developing world has had to adjust in a brief period
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of thirty years! In addition, technological catch-up becomes
increasingly more difficult for underdeveloped nations

because of geometric increases in both information and
the advance of technology.

As Deutch points out, the effects of modernization
can be charterized as, a "process by which major clusters
of old social, economic and psychological commitments are
eroded or broken and people become available for new
AO

patterns of behavior."

The change of these cultural

factors directly ties too and impacts social stability.

Writing in 1982 Chalmers Johnson suggests that, several
factors contribute to the maintenance of social stability.
He believes that for societies to remain stable, members

must realize there will be inequities in wealth, power

and status and that they willingly accept these inequities.
He further contends that men accept these inequalities

because social values have taught them to do so. Thus,

the key factor for stability in a society is the maintenance
of existing values. Any change in the system that is not

in harmony with the social norms places the society in
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a state of disequilibrium.

Johnson argues that, on the other hand, societies

that have long term equilibrium have fulfilled the following
four functions: (1) values and norms have been effectively
transmitted to children and immigrants; (2) society has

adapted to changes in terms of both economics and the
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physical setting of the society; (3) there has been

effective allocation of resources and policies which best
reflect the good of society as a whole; and (4) there is
integration of basic values between the layers of society

and a desire for restraint of those deviating from the
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norm.

All of these social functions were, of

course, destroyed or largely disrupted under colonial rule.
Most societies are able to remain in equilibrium in spite

of change; but in societies that have experienced little
change for a long time, even a minor change can be quite

destabilizing. The problem facing these societies is that
changes, and their reaction to them, tend to continue and

multiply rather than die out after the orginal disturbance

thus throwing the society into further disequilibrium.
Johnson has concluded that disequilibrium and multiple

dysfunctions result in either new policies or revolution
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as societies seek equilibruim.

Responses to colonialism and Third World solidarity

In 1955 twenty-four countries met in Bandung Indonesia
and held a conference on Asian-African affairs. Represented

were: Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon,

Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Vietnam and Yemen. The
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conference addressed economics, culture, human rights and

the most important issue of its time, self-determination.

With repect to colonialism the Conference agreed:

(A) that colonialism in all its manifestations

is an evil which should speedily be brought to
an end;

(B) affirmed that subjugation, domination,

and exploitation, constitutes a denial of fundmental human rights, is contrary to the Charter
of the United Nations and is ah impediment to the

promotion of world peace and cooperation;
(C) declared its support of the cause of freedom
and independence for all such people, and;
(D) called upon the powers to grant freedom
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and independence to all such peoples.

The importance behind the Bandung Conference was that

it represented the beginnings of the Non Aligned Movement.
These political forces later evolved into regional as well
as international Pan Arab, Pan Islam and Pan African
movements.
.

■

I

The second expression of Thifd World solidarity was
the 1958 All-African People's Conference. The participants

came from twenty-eight countries ^nd non-government
entities. Meeting in Ghana to discuss their respective
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problems, they declared that the African Continent had

been arbitrarily divided up by foreign powers to the
detriment of indigenous Africans. The participants concluded

that Africans had gone through two phases of colonialism.
In the first phase, their lands were taken and owned by
foreigners and, in the second, they were suppressed by
white immigrarits who effectively used their own black
military to crush indigenous revolutionary forces. The
Conference concluded with the condemnation of "colonialism

and imperialism in whatever shape or form these evils are

perpetuated."^'^ Finally, the conference sanctioned:
its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa,
to all those who resort to peaceful means of
non-violence and civil disobedience as well as to

all those who are compelled to retaliate against
violence to attain national independence and freedom
for the people.

Reactions to indigenous self-determination and independence

Neocolonialism signifies colonialism gone full circle
because, like mercantilism, it represents economic dominance

or control as the force behind conquest. It uses newer
techniques than traditional forms of imperialism but with

the same destructive results. As Walter Langsam points
out the tools imperialists use are: "leaseholds and

concessions, spheres of influence and interest,
protectorates, financial and tariff control,
extraterritoriality and, finally mandates.
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The chief

institutions of neocolonialism have been the transnational

corporations which are generally based in the developed
world.

Neocolonialism as an adjustment to earlier policies

began after WW II when most of the industrialized nations
recognized that unrest and cries for independence by their
colonies was imminent. As a result, they redesigned their

policies toward their colonies to assure themselves of
economic primacy after colonial independence. In preparation
for withdrawal, imperialist nations followed several steps
to insure their continued economic dominance over their

colonies. Professor Chinweizw assigns these steps

to certain geographic locations but they may be correctly
viewed as global:

(1) Africanizing the colonial administrative
bureaucracy- a process whereby the central colonial
administrative machinery as well as the various
native administration, would be delivered into
the hands of an educated African petite-bourgeois
mandarate,

(2) Training the cream of the African petite-

bourgeois politicians in the ways and means of
European liberal capitalist democracy;
(3) Selecting and guiding into power some faction
of the petite-bourgeois to whom the legitimizing
instruments of colonial power would be transferred
at the end of the tutelage; and

(4) Greating the most controllable political units
by federating some colonial units here and breaking
up others there.
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CONCLUSIONS

Colonialism and the tools

of Imperialism have left

a legacy of: border wars; ra Dial wars; irredentist
conflicts; wars for national liberation that are often

ions of cultural supremacy
fought unconventionally; noti
of the white race; meshed religion with nationalism; and

deprived underdeveloped coun tries of new technology early
on in their societies developiment and then later indirectly
reduced the time for them to

readjust to newer innovations,

All of the above have led to a path of multiple dysfunctions

in the underdeveloped world vhich produces a seemingly
never ending cycle of coups, mass revolutions, and elite
intransigence.
In order to correct pas t injustices, industrialized
nations need to recognize their roles in establishing and
contributing to many of the aggressive forces found in
Lzation has set a chaotic course
the Third World today. COloni

for the world by arbitrarily drawing lines across the planet
which often divide indigenous peoples into separate and
hostile nations. Moreover, tle implementation of divide
and rule has set those tribes

and families who are in power

against the wishes of indigenous inhabitants causing

additional social dysfunctiops

which are then reflected

in regional disputes.
Contemporary affairs are the logical extension of
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colonial policies buttressed by Realism. It could be argued
that one of the functions served by Realism is to legitimize
colonial rule. Realists contend, national interest can

be defined as national power. Accordingly, for nation-states
to maintain their viability they must pursue their military

and economic interests. Thus, realists assert there are
no morals that can be applied universally to govern an

anarchical world. In fact, the only "good" policy is one
that maintains state sovereignty. These precepts effectively
dismiss colonial domination and serve as the subject of
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
REALISM

46

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the
predominant school of international thought known as
Realism. The section discusses what Realists believe in

general by; defining the keystone on which their argument
bears, namely that national power is national interest;

examines the Realist position on international trade; and

concludes with the Realists' stance on morality and
international politics.

Classical European theory assumes the state is the
fundamental unit of international politics and exists as
a hard-shelled unit with all human activities, political

and nonpolitical, occurring in isolation and unrelated
1

to e^vents transpiring beyond their borders.

Classicism

buttressed strategic balance of power theories which saw
the international arena as an anarchic environment in which

each state sought to maintain or maximize its power for
2

fear of military domination by outside forces.

These

thoughts are reflected in the writings of, international
relations theorists known as Realists.

Realists believe history has taught us that
international laws and organizations are limited in worth.

They contend that there are no mutual long-term interests

that can galvanize nation-states together because states
have conflicts in their national objectives, that is,

conflicts that are reinforced by states asserting
international policies that are dictated by the different
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capabilities which they posses.^ These capabilities consist
of many elements besides military power including: levels
of technology, geography, demographics, national resources,

potential leadership, type of government, and national
4

ideology.

In addition. Realists claim that international politics
cannot act as any standard bearer of ethics. They presume
that man is an evil creature who hungers for power and
whose nature has been set by divine providence. Therefore
little can be accomplished through voluntary forms of

international law or education to change man's greedy
nature. Furthermore, Realists assert that the best way

for men to achieve peace is by instituting a system that

pits their nasty and brutish natures against each other
as depicted by Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes.
Through this interplay, it is assumed that nations become
motivated by self interest to maintain the equilibrium
and refrain from attacking each other. What follows is

a discussion of each of the pertinent elements outlined
above. This will be accomplished by first addressing the

Realists' concerning the international polity.

According to Richard Mansbach, the Realist paradigm
can be broken into three fundamental assumptions:

(1) Nation-states and/or their decision-makers
are the most important set of actors to examine
in order to account for the behavior in

international politics.
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(2) Political life is bifurcated into "domestic"
and "international" spheres, each subject to its
own characteristic traits and laws of behavior.
(3) International relations is the struggle for

power and peace. This struggle constitutes a single
issue occurring in a single system and entails
a ceaseless and repetitive competition for the
single stake of power. Understanding how and why

that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for

^

regulating it is the purpose of the discipline.
In addition to Mansbach's findings, I believe that
Realists share a fourth assumption which focuses on the

notion that history has, and is, an active teacher of

foreign policy. That is, the behavior of states in their
relations with other states have conformed to certain

patterns throughout history and will continue to do so.
This assumption is accentuated in the works of Realist

George Kennan who basis his theory on historical materials
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

However

the recurring patterns of historical behavior should not

be misinterpreted as contributing to science. Nor is this
historical issue to be construed that there is a single
cause that determines international relations. Rather,

causes might more rightfully be seen as multiple, and the
result of anarchy or the struggle for power. In fact,
Idealists and the so-called reformers are faulted for

seeking a "single cause and the scientific formula to remedy

it...""^
Hans Morgenthau further clarifies the Realist's position
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in his book Politics Among Nations where he outlines six

principles of realism. First he claims, "that politics,
like society in general, is governed by objective laws
Q

that have their roots in human nature."

Accordingly, to

understand or even improve man's condition we must focus

upon the fact that societies are governed by laws that
have been determined by human nature and cultural mores

in some objective manner no matter how imperfect they might
seem. This leads Morgenthau to deduce that politics is

rooted in human nature which lends to the former's
character. Thus, politics is at best imperfect, reflecting

man's imperfect nature. While he acknowledges that the
law of human nature was built upon the philosophies of
ancient civilizations, he hastens to add that scholars
should not discard the theory simply because of the passage

of time. Realism then, seeks objectivity and to distinguish

truth from opinion. To accomplish this objectivity. Realists
garner facts and give them meaning through reason. However,
the dissection of facts does not in itself complete nor

satisfy the inquiry into human nature. Morgenthau suggests
that when we study foreign policy an eye must be kept on
the humaness of statesmen pursuing policy. By inserting

the human factor into the discipline of international

relations we not only add to the factual meaning of the

field but can also, through role playing, determine what
alternatives are open and most likely to be chosen by
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statesman.

Mogenthau's seeond assumption is that under the realist

paradigm the fundamental unit of analysis "is interest
10

defined in terms of power."

This concept links reason

with facts and separates politics aside from other non

political issues "such as economics (understood in terms
of interest defined as wealth) ethics, aesthetics or

religion.

Thus, for a politician to be called a statesman

he ought to act in terms of interest defined as power.
Thinking as a statesman Realists must then must reject
"the concern with motives and the concern with ideological

preferences" since a politician may act on morally good

motives yet, nevertheless, produce morally indefensible
19

results.

Morgenthau claims, such is the case of Neville

Chamberlain, who acted on moral grounds of pursuing peace

and subsequently, made World War II inevitable. Thus

Morgenthau argues, that while "good motives give assurance
against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee
the moral goodness and political success of the policies
they inspire."

Concomitantly, Realists avoid philosophic

penchants and focus upon the "official duty" as compared
to the more normative "personal wish" which would expand

personal moral and political values. Separation from this
normative desire aids in fostering rationality as opposed
to coloring academic inquiry.

Third, Morgenthau contends that the operational
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definitions of national interests and national power are
not static. While men are motivated by self interests/

these interests are changed periodically along with foreign

policy and the movement of time. Likewise, power may also

change its tactics while retaining the simple premise that
14

power is the "domination of man by man".

Lastly, he makes

the case that prevailing political conditions are not fixed
and will continue to fluctuate with the ever changing

balance of power as the international political system
seeks new equilibriums.

Fourth, Morgenthau believes that universal principles

are not abstractly applicable to foreign policy. They argue
that the state has a responsibility to safeguard the lives

and property of its citizens even though individuals within
the state may opt to perish over pursuing policies of

injustice as a matter of conscience. But, as Morgenthau
points out, "successful political action itself (is)
15

inspired by the moral principle of national survival."
Further, he claims there can be no political morality

without prudence and believes "the weighing of the

consequences of alternative political actions-to be the

supreme virtue in politics" ^ and as such replaces morality
with reasoning.

The fifth postulate holds that any affirmation of
universal morality and its impact on political actions

is spurious. In fact, to equate morality with policy making
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is to distort sound judgment and subject states to self

destruction. Destruction which is foreshadowed by the moral
principle of god himself. However, Morgenthau recognize

that few nations have been able to resist the temptation
to equate their political actions as the result of high
moral aspirations or divine inspiration.

Sixth, Morgenthau argues that politics ought to have

primacy when compared to other spheres such as economics,
law and moral principles. Therefore, in the words of
Morgenthau, "political realism takes issue with the

'legalistic-moralistic approach' to international
17

politics."

.

.

This is not to discard other disciplines but

that Realists must examine them in there proper function.

Because this issue is difficult for some readers to grasp,
Morgenthau uses three historical examples of which two

are summarized as follows. In the first example, he
illustrates the legalistic approach by discussing the Soviet
attack on Finland in 1939 and the responses elicited from

France and Great Britain^ Both states were legally
responsible for the joint defense of Finland under the

Covenant of the League of Nations, however Sweden refused

to allow troops to pass through their territory. Had Sweden
permitted entry, France and Great Britain would have been

at war with the Soviet Union and Germany simultaneously.
From the Realist perspective, France and Great Britain

errored in that, "instead of asking both questions, that
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of law and of power, they asked only the question of law;

and the answer they received could have no bearing on the
1ft

issue that their very existence might have depended upon."
The second example, the moralistic approach, examines the

rise of Communist China and the Western reaction. Morgenthau
believes that the Western world was confronted with two

questions, one moral, and the other political. Rather than

rely on power to determine policy, the negative answer
came in the moral refusal to accept China's rejection of
Western morality. Morgenthau asserts this egregious error

"to arrive at this conclusion by neglecting this test
altogether and answering the political question in terms
of the moral issue was indeed a classic example of the
1Q

moralistic approach

to international politics.

Hedley Bull agrees with Morgenthau's second assumption
and contributes to the Realist school by identifying order
as the common theme shared among nation-states. He posits
that five elements effect international order "first there

is the goal of preservation of the system and the society
20

of states itself."

Whatever differences there may be

between nation-states, the states have always clung to

the belief that each shares the responsibility for
protecting the system itself. The second element Bull offers

is that nation-states share the common goal of maintaining
their individual independence and national sovereignty.

But collectively they may see the demise of individual
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states as "subordinate to preservation of the society of
states itself: this reflects the predominant role played

in shaping international society by the great powers, which
21

view themselves as its custodians."

As a result many

small weaker states have been fed to the opposition in

hope of preserving the balance of power.
The third element of Bull's hypothesis is that
the states share desire for peace. This is not an

establishment of universal or lasting peace but only the
absence of war which may, from time to time, be breached
as nefeded to re-establish an international balance of power.
Thus he claims societies recognize and value the right

to wage war in order to maintain the survivability of the
system itself; juxtaposing peace with common safety and
security.

Fourth, and common to all states, is the protection
and limitation of violence which results in "death or bodily

harm, the keeping of promises and the stabilization of

possession by rules of property.

By this Bull means

that: (1) states cooperate to maintain their monopoly of

violence, and deny the right to employ it to other groups.;
(2) accept that using violence against embassies as taboo;
and (3) have consistently agreed to the rules of war.

International promises, on the other hand, are usually
entered into with good intent. However, if the treaty
dissolves the international sphere readjusts
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and continues

23

to accept treaties by "salvaging the principle itself."

Finally, Bull assumes that states operate by a "mutual
recognition of sovereignty (property)" which has been
derived from a historical past in which "certain territories
,,24

and peoples were the property or patrimony of the ruler.
In sum, what Bull's theory argues is that states have
established a system of order from chaos and, like

Morgenthau, he believes that"man responds to social
OR

situations with repetitive patterns."

He argues that

while the present system is not Utopian it is the best

we can hope to achieve relegating man to reoccurring

patterns of institutional behavior and thus implying that
history is "static" or "circular".

Defining National Power as National Interest

The efficient use of power by nation-states is the
cornerstone on which the Realist argument bears. Therefore,

it is necessary to define national power and national
interest in the Realist context. Although there is no

consensual definition of power we can safely assume as

does Morgenthau, that it involves domination of man over

man.^^ By operationalizing this definition we can see
similarities among Realists in their application of power.

For example, Nicholas J. Spykman claims that power moves
mankind through "persuasion, purchase, barter, and
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coercion."

Klaus Knorr contends that power is "only (the)

exercise of coercive influence" and is primarily the domain
of the military.28 Although K.J, Holsti's specific
definition consists of three parts in which he identifies

power as: "(1) The acts by which one actor influences
another actor; (2) the capabilities utilized for this

purpose: and (3) the response elicited." He too claims

that by-in-large it is the "general capacity of a state
2Q

to control the behavior of others."

if power is only

exercised coercively, as Knorr suggests, and it is primarily
military, then the preservation of a railitarily defeated

state would be an act of magnanimity by the victor. However,

if we hold to Holsti's action-reaction hypothesis we find
that self-interest motivates the vietor as it searches

for order while, on the other hand, self-preservation
motivates the defeated state. Such is the case of the recent

defeat of Iraq by the allied forces. Rather than suffer
instability and perhaps an even greater nemesis, the allies
withheld military support at the early end of the war to
both the Shi''ites bf the south and the Kurds of the north.

Having defined po#et we must^^l

it to the, often

in defiance concept of, "national interest". However, we
must illuminate the term national interest because as Jack

Piano points out in the following definition it ought to
referred to as national interests.

57

The national interest of a state is typiGally a
highly generalized conception of those elements
that constitute the state's most vital needs. These
include self-preservation, independence, territorial
integrity, military security, and economic well
being. Because no single interest dominates the
policy-making functions of a government, the concept
might be referred to more accurately in the plural
as national interests.

How then is power linked to interest? Simply it is
the need or desire to protect any of the interests listed

above by what ever means are efficient and necessary. Also,
the contrapositive is true. That is, when national interests

are strong, national power is strengthened. Thus, one cannot
exist without the other and when one is weakened the other

follows. In fact, one might conclude that a state's
objectives expand after ah increased levels of power have
been attained and therefore a country's objectives are
or ought to be reduced after it suffers a loss of power.
This premise gives credence to periods of colonialism that
were followed by intense periods of nationalism and creation

of international organizations to control power.

International Organizations

Realists believe international organizations and
international trade are limited in their ability to provide

international order and global cohesion. Kenneth Waltz
asserts that many economists and political scientists have

incorrectly assumed that interdependence between nations
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is on the rise due to the growth of the multinational

corporations.^^
Waltz believes that scholars have made an error in

assuming that international trade will promote international
detente. He claims that theorists make a mistake by looking

at international trade as though it was fixed in time and

by not contrasting present day volume of trade with those

of previous economic periods. For example, current trade
among the two super powers is meager; this was not the
case in the years prior to WWI when the two major powers
Great Britain and Germany were primary trading partners.
He reasons that additional trade between countries will

not solve international struggles for power. Moreover data

shows that interdependence between developed and lesser
developed nations has actually been reduced when we take
into account GNP growth. According to Waltz there has been
a rise in GNP among the developed nations while there has
been a simultaneous decrease in the demand for primary

products produced in Under Developed Countries (UDC's).
As a result of GNP growth, "trade among developed countries
accounted for 37.2 %of world trade; 12 years later the
amount had increased to 46.5 % (during the same

period) trade of less-developed with developed countries
32

accounted for 19.3 % (and later) decreased to 14 %."

Therefore, Waltz is claiming that current ties between

developed and UDC's are less strong than those fostered
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under imperialism.

Waltz further rebuffs those who lay claim to the
importation of raw materials from UDC's as a case for

interdependence. Although developed nations do import large
quantities of raw materials "the quantity of imports is
not just a function of scarcity it is also a matter of

price."

Thus, trade between developed and underdeveloped

nations do not constitute dependence but may in fact
represent; (1) reliability of supply rather than exclusive

possession of a resource; (2) a vast number of suppliers
which means fewer profits for the exporters and less

dependence by importers; (3) the hoarding of raw materials
which has rekindled production from many local producers;

and (4) using trade as a catalyst to substitute previously
imported goods with locally produced items.
Finally, Waltz attacks theorists who believe there

is a high degree of interdependence among nation-states.
He claims that for many theorists, "the rhetoric of
interdependence has taken on some of the qualities of an

ideology.

This is accomplished when scholars by-pass

inequalities associated with an uneven national capabilities

and assume that trade arrangement are reciprocal.
Interdependence he says, forces each state to treat the

other's "acts as though they Were events within its own
borders" while dependence places each state in the role
36

of an adversary.

Finally, he faults theorists for not
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taking into account the near self-^sufficiency of many
nation-states; many of whom have become insulated from
extreme shifts in the global economy.
In concert with Waltz, theorist Edward L. Morse claims

in his article "The Politics of Interdependence", given
the increased modernization of UDC's, there are two ways

theorists can view recent movements in international
relations: Either world politics is becoming more

interdependent or they are becoming more independent. Those
theorists that believe that the world is being shaped by

independence contend that the state remains the primary
actor and that increased levels of domestic transactions

act to buttress state sovereignty.

On the other hand,

many theorists hold that modernization and concomitant
incres-ses in world trade h^ve made the world more

interdependent and as such leave nations more secure and
better off than they where before. Morse believes these
theorists are mistaken in their assumption because growth

in international trade,does not necessarily imply growth

in national security. He argues that this is because

international trade perpetuates the "absence of over arching

structures of authority, and the competition for survival,
and the maximization of power results inevitably in

conflict."

Therefore, nations focus on, and are preoccupied
38

with, national security.

In contrast to Waltz and Morse, Klaus Knorr argues
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less stridently that international trade is not producing

greater interdependence. In fact he states that "the
exercise of international power and influence takes place

in an increasingly interdependent world.

II

39

He qualifies

his position by contending that:
To assume that growing international enmeshment
means the ascendance of global or regional over

national politics is very dubious, because the
process of modernization also strengthens domestic
integration and generates more demands for domestic
state action. Nor is it true that the process has,
so far at least, made interstate relations more
peaceful and accommodative.

His studies have led him to conclude that international

interdependence is characterized by asymmetries of wealth
that result in a disadvantage of poor and weaker states.
This causes the latter states to worry and be apprehensive

regarding the wealthier*s motives. In addition, economic
spillover effects from wealthier nations exacerbate
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conditions further complicating the issue.

Departing

from the mainstream of Realism, Knorr argues that the weaker
and poor nations should enjoy protection from poverty and

uneven power, "and that this protection should be rooted
in new universal norms and, based on these, administered

by international institutions."^^

Morality and the Realist

When discussing what some might label as an amoral
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point of view, it must be noted that Realism takes its

philosophical bearings on the works of Machiavelli*s The
Prxnce, and Hobbes' The Great Leviathan. Both argue that
it was necessary for leaders to have a different set of

morals for governing in an anarchical world. It is not

surprising that contemporary theorists and practitioners
take their philosophic mandates from these men because
like Machiavelli and Hobbes, they too see the need for

a strong state. More recently, and equally important, are
the works of Rienhold Neibuhr who, among others based his

arguments on the Bible. According to Niebuhr the Bible
assumes that all men were inherently evil. Thus he reasoned

that international problems were the direct result of men

trying to usurp God's divine authority. He coined this
as the "will to power" that mankind desired power for the
sake of having power. He believes that as an individual s

greed for power increases his aspiration to become
Christ-like diminishes. Thus, the trend toward immorality

compounds itself due to increases in the numbers of
individuals. Because of this "universal immorality", Niebuhr
/

held that a balance of power must be struck to achieve
some fashion of order and justice. However it should be

pointed out that he did not entirely approve of certain
immoral methods used by statesmen.

Hans Morgenthau defines his arguments in a more

structured and prescriptive manner than does Reinhold
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Niebuhr. Morgenthau believes that morality gives man his

humanness and separates him from animals and argues that
there should be morality in domestic politics.

Moreover,

he asserts that morality in domestic polity is of value

and "is not a utilitarian instrument aiming at the
protection of society, even though its observance has this

effect, but its commands are absolute and must be obeyed
for their own sake.

Finally, Morgenthau looks at the

level in which the interplay occurs. He argues that at
the domestic level there are fewer numbers of men with

differing ideas as to what is moral. Since morals are
instituted by men they will differ from culture to culture

and from man to man. Therefore, Morgenthau deduced that
when the:

responsibility for government is widely distributed
among a great number of individuals with different
conceptions as to what is morally required in
international affairs, or with no such conceptions
at all, international morality as an effective
system of restraints.upon international policy
becomes impossible." ■

Morgenthau's views conflict when domestic polity and
international relations merge. If, aS he states, domestic

morality is to be prized, what happens when popular support

wanes with respect to official international policy? Rather
than acquiesce to Populist pressure, Morgenthau states:

Whenever these two sets of conditions diverge,
those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy
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are confronted with
must sacrifice what
the alter of public
means, gain popular

a tragic choice. Either they
they consider good policy on
opinion, or they must by devious
support for policies ^gose

tru© natur© is conc©al©d from th© public.

George Kennan supports Morgenthau's views of morality.
He too believes that moral principles have a place in

shaping individual conduct both as a citizen and as a
government official. However he believes that when
individual moral philosophy merges with millions of other
individual philosophies it is transformed and the original

precepts are no longer valid. Thus governments are not
the creator of morals but only an agent for the collective

morality; "and ho more than any other agent may it attempt
If 47

to be the conscience of its principle.

65

CHAPTER FOUR
TRANSNATIONALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE
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Increasingly the world's maps are showing antiquated
borders. People, ideas, commodities and social mores flow
across state lines. Interstate problems that were once

solved by the diplomat and the soldier are now finding
other actors such as individuals, multinational

corporations, non-governmental organizations and even

intergovernmental organizations imposing their demands
on the international system. Thus, both problems and
solutions are moving beyond the purview of the state.
Transnationalism is challenging the long established.

Realist inspired. State eentric model which contends that
the state is a hardshelled unit with international relations

occurring outside of the unit. Because Transnationalism
has more elements than Realism, this chapter will provide

more additional information in greater depth than the

previous chapter for two reasons. First, Transnationalism

seeking to displace the existing model; and second, the
theory is broader in scope and more complex. This section
is divided into several subsections. The first seeks to
define transnationalism as variations of a theme and offers

various definitions which seek to clarify and resolve the

ambiguities associated with the new paradigm. The second

section examines the growing interdependence of politics
and economics. In the third section inquiry will focus

on the impact of technology in international relations
through a discussion of the product cycle and the
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appropriations theory. Fourth, an analysis of the emergence
of the Multinational Corporation as an international actor

will be presented. The fifth section illuminates the growth

of international organizations and their impact on
international relations, finally, this section will provide
a synopsis of the major debates between the scholars so

that the reader can more easily discern the entire paradigm.

Defining Transnationalism

According to Seymond Brown "the alignments and
antagonisms of the recent past are shifting ground and
structures premised on their stability appear to be

crumbing."1 The realignment reflects a dissolution of the
cold war balance of power and a renewed focus toward other

structures such as "ethnicity, religion, social class,
economic function, and generation with each vying for a
large piece of pie."

This movement away from the state

having sole control over international relations was first

identified as Political Linkage and then due to misusage
of the term, has become known as Transnationalism (see
figure 4.1).

Unlike the State Gentric theorists, Transnationalism
demands that theorists separate themselves from their
respective national interests and social mores that could

color their perception of international relations. As a
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Figure 4.1
Interrelationships

Aclor D

Actor /I

Actor C

Obstacles to theory building require a radical revision
of the standard conception of (state) politics that

posits a world of national and international actors
whose interrelationships loolc like this.

(Transnational Theory) requires supplementing the
conventional conception with one that looks like (the
following incorporating multiple linkages between
states and non state actors).

Aclor A

Actor D

Actor C

or even this:

From: James N, Rosenau, ed., J.inkage Politics, (New York;
Free Press, 1969), p. 45.
69

result Transnationalists see national borders as too limited
a criterion for illuminating all of the activities that
occur in the international arena.

The perception that

government's role has diminished as the primary actor varies
from scholar to scholar. But in general theorists agree
that Transnationalism is "the processes whereby

international relations conducted by governments have been

supplemented by relations among private individuals, groupsf
and societies that can and do have important consequences

for the course of events"^ These Transnational interactions
are not new and do not supersede interstate politics "but
they affect interstate politics by altering the choices

open to statesmen and the costs that must be borne for
adopting various courses of action." (see figure 4.2).
Transnational interactions can be further refined by

process. In concert with the basic premises of this study
is the notion that output takes precedence over input,
all of which James Rosenau identifies as recurring sequences

of behavior. That is, that linkage as a basic unit of

analysis, can be operationalized through the application
of "initial" and "terminal" stages which, Rosenau no doubt

drawing on the work of David Easton, labels respectively

as outputs and inputs. These stages are in turn classified
as taking place within a polity or its external environment.

Citing Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) Rosenau is quick
to point out that:
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Figure 4.2

Nve and Keohane's Interaction Patterns

A STATE-CENTRIC INTERACTION
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From Joseph S. Nye and Robert 0. Keohane. "Transnational
Relations and World Politics: An Introduction.
International Organization, Vol 25 Number 3 Summer
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Although the term 'environment' has special meanings
for students of international politics/ in this
discussion it is employed in the more general,

systems theory sense with which students of
comparative politics are familiar. It is conceived
as an analytic entity consisting of all the human
and nonhuman phenomena that exist external to a

polity, irrespective of whether their existence
is perceived by the actors of the polity.

Accordingly "environmental inputs" are those social
expressions that occur in the external environment that
gave rise to the policy outputs. Concomitantly,
"environmental outputs" are those behaviors that begin
in the external environments of a polity and are either

supported or terminated within a polity. Finally, "polity
inputs" are those social expressions occurring within a
polity that are the result of environmental outputs.

This

input-output method of conflict resolution was the first
model used by Transnationalists to describe the emergence

of the theory from a closed hard shelled system. The

political theory has changed to the point that the first

portion of his pseudo-Eastohian model is not as valid as
the second portion of Rosenau's discussion.

Aside

from his Eastonian premise Rosenau claims there are three

types of interactions or linkage ptocess. First, "the
penetrative process occurs when members of one polity serve

as participants in the political process of another."
Such participants include, for example, armies,
corporations, terrorists, international organizations,
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foreign aid missions, like the Peace Corps or Cuban
teachers, and transnational political parties such as the
Christian Social Democrats. Rosenau saw these links as

direct. In contrast, the "reactive process...is brought

into being by recurrent and similar boundary- crossing
reactions rather than by the sharing of authority."

in

the reactive process the actor's initial output is in
response to some form of direct or indirect stimuli from

another entity. Rosenau is led to conclude that this process
is the most common form of international linkage. Finally,

the emulative process "is established when the input is
not only a response to the output but takes essentially
10

the same form as the output."

Modernization is an example

of this emulative process and while it can be closely tied

to the penetrative process it has a spillover effect and
is not the result of direct actions or policies imposed
upon another state.

Nye and Keohane offer a much simpler explanation of
transnational interaction. They see transnational
interactions as "...the movement of tangible or intangible

items across state boundaries when at least one actor is

not an agent of a government or an international
11

organization."

Thus, they contend there are four types

of global interactions; (1) communication which is occurring
at increased rates and provides for rapid dispersal of

"beliefs, ideas and doctrines"; (2) increased modes of
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transportation which allow for "the movement of physical
objects, including war materiel and personal property as
well as merchandise"; (3) international finance; and (4)
19

travel. ^

■According to Nye and Keohane, transnational

interactions have, and continue to, produce at least five
results: (1) attitude changes, (2) international pluralism,

(3) increased constraints on,states through dependence
and interdependence, (4) increases in the ability of certain

governments to influence others, and (5) the emergence
of autonomous actors with private foreign policies that
13

may deliberately oppose or impinge on state polices."
Walter Jones offers yet another perspective of
Transnationalism by postulating that:

(The) contact between two or more nongovernmental
actors, or between one official actor and one or
more private actors. The nongovernmental participants

may be corporations interest groups, political
parties, elite structures or formally instituted
organizations designed to facilitate private
relations. An agreement between an oil company and
a foreign government falls in this category, as
does contact between the International Red Cross

and the government of Cuba^ An International Youth

Conference involving no governments, is also
transnational.

Jones* definition is one of the most comprehensive yet

it too contains an oversight. It does not fully encompus
all relevent actors who have influence apart from their

institutional positions as non-governmental actors for
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example, Albert Schweitzer, Mother Theresa and Andrei
Sakharov. However, even with its faults it is the most
comprehensive explanation.

The Growing Interdependence of Economics and Politics

The key issue and pivotal to the theory of
transnationalism, is the rate at which international

interdependence takes place. According to Transnationalists
increases in the level of interdependence buttress the

validity of the theory. However one of the problems facing
theorists is defining just exactly what interdependence
is. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein in their article,

"Interdependence: Myth and Reality" attempt to define the
■
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term and show a high degree of interdependence between
states exists. They believe that interdependence can be
defined as: (1 ) relationships between states that are linked
so that if one nation's interests change others will be

affected; (2) interdependence can be a function of economics

sensitizing states to changes within that sphere; and/or
(3), using Kenneth Waltz's definition, it would be a

"relationship that would be costly to break."

15

Rosecrance

and Stein believe that Waltz's definition deviates

significantly from the other two in that there is the

presumption of a positive relationship between states.
David Singer also identifies several stibsystems that
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promote interdependence. He claims there are several
"Intra-National Entities" like families, tribes and

employers that act to either defuse or legitimate ideas
and promote social norms. Equally as important in the

political socialization process are governments and non
governmental entities such as "trade unions,
industrial-commercial associations, banking and investment

institutions, professional societies, vocational groups,

ethnic, ideological, and religious organizations, separatist

movements, and finally, political parties."^® Second, Singer
believes that foreign policy is effected by "Extra- National
Entities". These entities cross over national borders either

physically or ideologically. A result of this cross linkage
is that many groups fuse with their counter parts in other
countries and ask them to exert some form of pressure on

their respective governments. Third, Singer sees "National
States" acting as mediators between those individuals

working at home and those citizens traveling abroad. Fourth,

he assumes that historically most "Inter-Nation Coalitions"
are historically recognized as military alliances but more

recently other inter- governmental organizations (IGO's)
such as the Arab League, NATO, OAS, Comintern, and The

Organization of African Unity, have begun to grow in
strength and place new and often greater demands on the
international community than previous military alliances.

Finally, Singer believes that there are "National
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Environments", or geopolitical conditions, which act to

link nations together. These environments include not only

contiguous borders but also
attributes like

regional and shared geographic
17

oceanic frontage, deserts or forests.

While David Singer correctly identifies many of the
elements that impact the international system he does not
address the linkages fostered by technology.

Technology

Technology has moved the global community toward a

greater interdependence and has been the underlying cause
of many of the recent revolutions particularly in Iran,

but also perhaps in Eastern Europe and China.
Robert Gilpin claims that the effect of modern

technology on the international relations scene has marked
one of the major schisms between the Transnationalists
and the Realists. On one hand the Transnationalists believe

that advancements in weaponry have changed the consequences

and as such, the nature of warfare. This shift, they
contend, is evident in the doctrine of mutual assured
destruction (MAD) that opts for suicide over victory.

Therefore military power has become of little use and is

no longer a rational option to conflict resolution. Thus,
strategies of power have been forced to change. Even Hans

Morgenthau concedes: "I think a revolution has occurred
77

...through the introduction of nuclear weapons into the
arsenal of warfare."
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On the other hand, the realists contend that their

theory, which hinges on the distribution of power, has
not been damaged because, although incidents of war have
declined, the threat to wage war has increased and enhanced
the position of the main actors.
Aside from the debate over technology and warfare,
Transnationalists believe that no nation can maintain a

monopoly in the area of research and development,
particularly as it is applied to the Multi^National

Corporation (MNC). Raymond Vernon agrees and argues for
this assumption in his theory of the Product Cycle.
Economic theorists, Raymond Vernon, William Gruber

and Dileep Mehta, have concluded a study in which they

contend, U.S. technology and related products pass through
19

four phases in what they deem to be a product cycle.

These theorists claim the cycle begins when managers respond
to a deficiency in the domestic market which they then

attempt to fill with a suitable product. Thus, MNC's begin
product development with the anticipation of selling at
home rather than abroad. During this initial phase firms

produce and innovate products at home for several reasons;

(1) the company has a ready supply of engineers, scientists
and technicians available to develop the product; (2) these
technocrats can interact with prospective buyers to work
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out any of the early bugs in the product; and (3) firms
like economic and social stability when they are introducing

or creating new products. This penchant for socioeconomic
stability is related to the firm's desire to be able to

anticipate swings in the domestic market and to be free
from excessive political interferencef allowing them to

produce without the fear of being banned or nationalized.
So, in phase one, product development becomes linked to
stable externalities and a compatible geographic proximity
for both the client and the manufacturer to perfect the
product.

The second phase is characterized by the
standardization of the product which leads to easier

production and utilization of previously existing parts.
According to Vernon, standardization causes the product
to be produced more efficiently and, as a result, prices
fall as the firm seeks a larger market. Due to the decline

in price the company monopoly becomes opened up to increased
threats by rival producers pursuing similar products while
using cheaper foreign labor.

In the third phase, the firm anticipating the loss

of its monopoly begins to shift its production from the

high-paid labor (and resources) found at home to cheaper
sources found abroad. However, firms still tend to act
on the threat more slowly than

rivals appropriate their

technology. Vernon assumes, that even though firms know
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rivals are intent on taking a portion of the existing

foreign market, firms act slowly because they often do

not perceive the threat until after the rival has already
begun to produce. In,addition, the innovator finally gets
the impetus to move pnly after it has suffered a reduction
20

in its foreign market.

Thus, in an attempt to hold on

to, or regain its original monopolistic advantage, the
firm sets up foreign production. As an indirect result,

the change in location of production effectively carries
the transfer of technology from the more developed nations

to the lesser developed countries (LDCVs). This transfer
is completed by either the establishment of foreign
subsidiaries or by licensing a foreign-held company to
produce in return for royalties.

Finally, foreign production outstrips indigenous

production leaving the developed nation a net importer
of its own technology. Therefore, according to Vernon,

the only way we, as a developed nation, can maintain our

comparative advantage is not in the production of the
product but in the continuing innovation of new
21

technology.

Steven Margee builds upon Vernon's product cycle by
focusing on the length of the innovative and maturation

phases. In concert w,ith Vernon, and key to Magee's
appropriations theory, is his belief that as long as
innovating firms continue to maintain their technological

80

lead over appropriators (copiers or thieves) they will

remain youthful and economically viable. But as firms expand
their operations, "emulators in the United States and abroad
reduce the profitability of innovations so that the

industry's product line shifts to older, more standardized
22

products".

Sadly, any turn toward standardization is

not conducive to the long term well-being of the U.S.

economy since the labor market dictates high wages. Thus,
standardized American industries tend to become moribund

and ask for government protection from foreign

competition.^^
In contrast to Vernon*s product cycle, Magee contends
that the flow of technology is best examined within the
context of the industry technology cycle. He believes that

the primary problem facing MNC's is the rivalry between
appropriators and innovators. This rivalry is spurred on
by the high cost of technology and the appropriators* desire

to steal technology, or at minimum, copy the product to
cut those costs. As a result, MNC's jealously guard their
trade secrets shifting their scientific knowledge in-house
between subsidiaries rather than produce the product, via
contract, on the open market.

Magee states that, some innovations are so widely

used they become publicly owned (i.e., the zipper) and
the return to the innovator falls. He calls this the

"appropriations problem." In an attempt to hedge against
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appropriations MNC's produce more complex technologies

because "sophisticated ideas are hard to copy."^^ Thus,
the "problem" requires firms to continue to pursue
additional research and development to stay alive.

Multi-National Corporate Growth

Even the most conservative of conteraporary scholars

should recognize that multi national corporations are key

players in every nation and in one way or another effect
every person on the planet.

Raymond Vernon defines the multinational corporation

as "a cluster of corporations of different nationalities
that are joined together by a parent company through bonds
of common ownership, that respond to a common strategy,
and that draw on a common pool of finances and human

resources."

He claims that the boundaries between states

are being lessened due to the influx of goods manufactured
abroad. No longer is it unusual to have goods that are
manufactured in different nations that are internationally
standardized.

Harry Magdoff contends, that business itself is

pursuing global cohesion as a method of increasing profits
and claims that "the advanced thinkers and publicists of

the business community have sounded the tocsin; the old
. .

,
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fashioned natiohstate is standing in the way of progress"
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However, he hastens to point out, that while multinational
corporations may represent integrated global production

they should not be thought of as efficient producers except
in the realm of exploitation of world resources. As
resources dwindle in one nation they began to shift to

cheap resources in found in another state. Accordingly
we must see MNCs as self serving and not as some benevolent

entity. A prime example of Magdoff's warning can be seen
in food production.
According to Francis Moore Lappe, increases in food

production have outstripped the increases in population
growth rate in every area of world except the African Sahel

since 1950. She claims that, "abundance, not scarcity,
27

best describes the supply of food in the world today."
The question then arises as to why there are starving people
in under developed countries. The answer is that, the

foodstuffs that are grown in those regions are either
exported by agribusiness to the developed world or are
disposed of in an inefficient manner, such as food for
livestock. As a result, many states are faced with importing

finished products, mono crop agriculture and a populace
that does not have the economic wherewithal to place food
on their tables.

Agribusiness is defined as anything used to produce

food from the seed to the refrigerator into which the
customer sticks their hand to pull out a product. In many
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respects agribusiness shares common business traits: (1 )
It is market-oriented; (2) The demand is stable and

inelastic; (3) Profit margins are low; (4) Income and profit
are slow but constant; and (5) Cash flows are large.
But agribusiness also has the uncommon trait of being
oligopic. That is, several large firms control most of

the output. They are characterized by their mutually
interdependent behavior, each considering their actions
on the others prior to changing policy.

Agribusiness is often asked to come into a developing
nation and advise its government on the best way to produce
a product. The reason UDC's ask agribusiness or MNC's to
come into their economies is, in part, because of their

need for foreign exchange. In turn, MNC's are attracted
to developing countries because of high profit rates, which

result from some combination of cheap labor, tax benefits,
new markets, and relaxed economic and environmental

regulations. In addition, MNC's benefit from other
developmental factors, such as access to foreign investment
capital; most importantly, they control most of the research

and development that is being applied to the UDC's new

agricultural product. Lastly, MNC's decide the marketing
strategies for the products. The advantage to agribusiness
firms is that controlling these developmental factors are
that as the they grow more powerful, they remove the

decision making processes away from the source of the
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products to their home base in a developed nation. The

centralizing of power occurs because UDC's cannot produce
technocrats which are needed for efficient indigenous
corporate operation, but more often because corporations
seek to increase profits and hide taxes due the state.

Finally, Third World elites conspire with the MNC management
because of a lack of loyalty to the state and people for
which they have a responsibility.

Growth of international Organizations

Transnationalists believe that world politics is
becoming increasingly more integrated. Scholars such as

Keohane, Nye and Rosenau claim, that separate national

entities which have political and/or economic power are
merging into supranational authorities. Although this
process is slow, multi layered, and tends to grow in spurts,
most scholars contend that the merging of economies is

usually the first step toward greater interdependence.
This is now transpiring in Europe under the European
Community.

Most theorists believe that increases in integration

are based on previously successful ventures. Therefore,
integration or progress on one front becomes linked to

progress in other sectors. However, not "even compatible
societies cannot integrate all public functions
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simultaneously."

Thus, federation can only take place

when several sectors become linked so that they produce

carry over effects. Walter Jones identifies the economic
sector as the primary sector, exemplified by various groups

like the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), organizations
which act to tie the economies of sovereign states together.
The second area that states integrate is the social
structure. This is much more difficult to achieve than

meshing economies since it involves changing individual

loyalties from village devotion to regional and then support
to nationalism and ultimately to a larger and more removed
political entity. The third area Jones addresses is
political. This area is even more difficult to promote
assimilation than the other two sectors because it demands

that nations yield a portion of their sovereignty to either

a regional system such as the European Community or an
international system, which to date is the U.N. The final

sector of integration is collective security. According
to Jones integrations of this type are rare and involves

more than building alliances, in which the dominate power
makes the decisions for the weaker nations. It implies

that politics and militaries of states become linked through
30

some time of crises.

However it remains to be seen whether

integration carries with it equality of decision making.
. !

.
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Questioning Jones, it seems that nations are more eager
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to join military forces in an effort to provide collective

security than for any other single reason of integration.

International Organization and Functionalism

Keohane

and Nye point out that Transnational

organizations impact interstate politics by effectively

producing

(1) attitude changes, (2) international pluralism,
(3) increased in constraints on states through
dependence and interdependence, (4) increases in
the ability of certain governments to influence
others, and (5) the emergence of autonomous actors

with private foreign policies that may deliberately
oppose or impinge on states policies.

Transnational organizations play a major role in promoting
world pluralism by linking national groups with their
counter parts in other nations. These transnational
organizations take two forms, international

intergovernmental organizations (IGGs) and non governmental
international organizations (NGOs), both of which emanate
from a parent organization or state which allocates
resources,

There has been a noticeable increase in the

chartering of IGO's as well as vast growth in NGO's in
recent years and particularly since the 1940's (see figure
4.3).

As a result of this growth, exchanges within the

international system have established new avenues by which
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Figure 4.3
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governments and organizations are able to exert influence
over outside governments.
According to Wallace and Singer the criteria for

an IGO is (1) the organization must have at least two
qualified members; (2) there must be a permanent secretariat

and a permanent headquarters; and (3) date that mark the

birth or death of each organization.

The growth in IGO's

is due to many factors; one of them is that nations on
low budgets are increasingly drawn to use international
34

organizations as their chief method of diplomacy.

Another

factor is that additional exchanges between states create

avenues by which governments are able to exert influence

over other governments. Still another factor is the

professional cohesion which bonds bureaucratic members
of one state to another through international
organizations.
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

defines a NonGovernmental Organization as "any international
organization which is not established by intergovernmental

agreement..."

NGO's vary greatly from charities to

political organizations but all share a common thread—
they are able to exert influence on the state. This element
of power draws additional members to the organizations.

Thus, non government actors control more resources than
*5 C\

in previous years

and "exist by integrating the

governments of nation-states or citizens of many states
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into a common organization."

Concomitantly, within the

borders of states NGO's also influence the growth of
autonomous actors that form policies that are in opposition
38

to the official policy.

Examples include the spread of

communism in the 1920s and 1960s, fascism and Nazism during

the 1930s and 40s, and the more recent spread of the Islamic
revolution.

The study of internatidnal intergovernmental
integration has fallen to a subfield of Transnationalism

known as functionalism or neofunctionalism (see figure

4.4). By definition, "functionalism is a theory which
describes a gradual progression from confrontational forms

of international cooperation to supranationalism." This
is done by fostering a process which reduces the differences

in political systems and by gradually increasing mutually
39

shared interests.

Functionalists argue both that

international cohesion will continue to increase as

economies become further integrated and that cooperation
in economic integration produces working relationships

between states which effectively bypass politics. However,

David Mitrany, "father" of functionalism, cautions that
economic parliaments that have been tried in the past failed

miserably and given today's climate it is even more
difficult to separate economies from social issues and

politics. Moreover, there is a penchant to expand
governmental institutions beyond their functional design
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Figure 4.4

Relationships Between Transnationalism, Functionalism
and Transnational Participation
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Government's Role As An International Actor

Is Diminishing

STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

The interaction Of Formal Government Structures Are

Providing The Matrix For A Larger Supranational
Organization. Elements include:

1) Intergovernmental organizations (IGO's)
2) Similar structures and institutions
3) Merging Economies

TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION

Entities From Outside The Formal Governmental Structure

Are Providing The Matrix For A Larger Supranationial
Organizations. Elements Include:

1) Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's)
2) Personalities

3) Technology

4) Multi National Corporations
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(MNC's)

and as such, policies and information becomes too mixed
to have validity. Paramount among his concerns is that

all of the past economic parliaments were dominated by
special interests. Instead of this political milieu, Mitrany
contends that international economics should fall under
40

the direction of nongovernmental organizations.

But

clearly, functionalists contend, working relationships
aid in the transference of loyalty from individual states

to a supranational organization which ultimately form into
41

a global community.

Neofunctionalists differ from functionalists in that,

while they agree economics has a major role to play, they
do not believe that social transformation will automatically
follow economics. Instead they contend that politics tends

to twist or push the integration process through "cultivated
spillover.

In this process energy from previous

successful ventures carries or spills over into another
sector and furthers integration between nation states.

Schisms Between The Theorists

There are two areas in which Transnational Theorists

are divided (see figure 4.5). The first debate centers
on benefits produced from international integration.

Surprisingly there are those within the field that believe
that international integration may produce more ills than
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Figure 4.5
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Pessimist and Optimist arguments cross over the schism
between opposing schools of thought. Optimism is higher
on the World Orderist side due to their commitment

of fostering world government. Pessimism is^higher

among the Globalists because they believe there is

an increased chance of anarchy due to changes within
international relations.

Diagrammed by Dr. Maghroori during an interview on
June 24, 1989,
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it will cure. This debate was termed by Ray Maghroori as

the optimist and pessimist conflict.'^^ The second debate
is on whether or hot Transnationalists should take an active

role leading mankind toward increased integration with
the ultimate aim being world government or, as others in
the field contend, merely report on the phenomena as
scientists. These two groups are respectively known as
World Orderists and the Transnationalist Globalists. Each

of these debates will be discussed below.

Optimists and Pessimists

The optimistic Transnationalists see the inter-twining
of political a;nd socio-ecohomic systems as a ray of bright

hope. They contend that integration of systems will

ultimately produce a world community and a world culture,
which in turn will give rise to a world state or

government.^^
On the other hand, pessimistic Karl Kaiser claims,

"transnational relations and other multinational process
seriously threaten democratic control of foreign policy,
particularly in advanced industrial societies.

Kaiser

contends that, due to transnationalism, domestic issues
have become embroiled with decisions that have been made
from outside the state and result in a loss of democratic

participation by those who reside within that state. He
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believes that the primary legitimacy for foreign policy
rests with those consenting to be governed. However,
increased intergovernmental participation might sway

constituents toward democratic solutions that may not be
in their best interest. He further claims, that the

influence of integration on the democratic process has
reduced the power of the Executive branch to enforce

regulations. This weakens the state's negotiating advantage
and moves any settlement into the sphere of competing
national interests. Thus, he concludes, increased
integration threatens the democratic process.

Transnationalist Globalists and World Orderists

Here again the field is split between two camps; the

system maintance proponents who claim that gradualism is
the best path to take as political scientists because it

will not upset stability, and the System- Transformers
who are seeking to push the system into reform before
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civilization collapses.

These two schools have become

known as the Trahsnationalist Globalist and the World
Orderists.

The Globalists unlike the Orderists "do not presume
to have discovered the dynamiGS of the underlying order,

in as much as uniform as those set by national interests

or the requirements of capitalism,"^^ They believe that
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slow integration of the functional elements between polities
will actually provide a more stable and less conflicting

world community than a pro-active approach that tends to
increase the probability of an anarchical world.
Whereas the Globalists see the withering of the nation-

state as a matter of fact, the World Orderists assert the
48

"state system inclines the world toward destruction."

They believe the state system must either be destroyed
as quickly as possible and some other form of Utopian system
be instituted in its place. They see themselves in a

pro-active role believing that it is their mission to show
the paths whereby the global village can achieve transition
to a higher human plain.

According to Richard Falk, the academic field of World
49

Order is primarily a North American invention.

In the

early stages the field was criticized as plagued with

advocacy rather than analysis. This reasoning was countered
by proponents who argued that the purpose of a higher
education included the placement of values.

Falk argues

that, "They concluded that anyone who insisted that

objectivity excluded normative considerations endorsed,
wittingly, or not, the status quo. In other words, an
II 51

academic inquiry could never be a neutral one".

The second criticism about Orderists is their

preoccupation with establishing a world government as a
means toward greater international co-operation and hence
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international security. Critics claim that the

unattainability of this goal makes the studies of this
field a waste of time.

The third criticism facing Orderists is their penchant
for cultural integration. Opponents argue that because

mores differ between cultures the promotion of Orderists'
ideology is a waste of time and that they should concentrate
on a more important factor--that human nature has common
traits that motivate human behavior. Falk believes that

there has been no accounting of human nature. Accordingly,
this has led to unsuccessful attempts by the
Transnationalists in general and the Orderists in particular

"to proceed from here to there. Or to employ more recent
terminology, in its attempt to solve the "transition

problem'."^2

Many different variables impact on the process of
transnational integration. Often there are quite a few
obstacles in the way for integration to occur and at other
times integration transpires with no problems at all.

Therefore when considering the variables before enacting
a policy or when studying the results of a policy we must

take into account the environment in which the integration
or proposed integration occurred.

Rosenau recognizes many different categories within

this environment. These include: (1> "The Contiguous
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Environment" such as "boundary disputes, historic rivalries,
traditional friendships and the many other distinctive
c: *5

features

of relations among immediate neighbors."

; (2)

"the Regional Environment," such as Central America, South
America and North America as opposed to Europe; (3) "the
Cold War Environment"; (4) "the Racial Environment" which
manifests itself in the strife between ethnic groups; (5)

"the Resource Environment," defined as "the activities
through which goods and services in the external world

of any polity are created, processed, and utilized," rather
C A

than the existence of the resources themselves

; and

(6) "the Grganizational Environment," such as the growth
of the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice.

The main challenges to Rosenau's theory of environments
can be traced to the wOrks of Lucien Pye (1965) and Gabriel

Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). The central thrust of their

thesis is that, every political system has a psychological
orientation toward a "political system and its various
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the

system".

According to Almond and Verba these psychological

orientations can be effectively translated into three types
of political orientations:

(1) "cognitive orientation," that is, knowledge
of a political system, its roles and the incumbents

of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs;
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(2) "affective orientation," or feelings about
the political system, its roles, personnel, and
performance, and

(3) "evaluational orientation," the judgments and
opinions about political objects that typically
involve the combination of value standards and

criteria with information and feeling.

Thus, the political culture of a particular society

can be defined as the "particular distribution of patterns
of cognitive, affective, and evaluational orientations

among the population toward political objects".

R7

The

frequency in which these elements are combined results

in three political cultures: the parochial, the subject
and the participant. The first culture lacks specialized

political roles and as a result individuals feel that the
political system will not respond to their needs. In the
second culture, indiviuals recognize that they are affected
by the output of the system but are removed from the input

process. Third, the participant political culture is one
in which individuals enjoy all of the aspects of the

political system even though they may be disillusioned
from time to time.

Almond and Verba further assert that political cultures
become diffused and that they simply do not replace one

another, but become combined with "earlier"orientations.

Therefore, "every political culture is a 'mix,' and the
classification of parochial, subject, and participant
cultures does not suggest homogeneity or uniformity, but
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the statistical frequency of particular orientations.
As such participant cultures include some parochials and

subjects. This mix often impedes the development of the
state and ultimately lends to state instability.
However a fundimental weakness in Almond and Verba's

approach is that it appears to be insensitive to cultural
variations between and within states. Nor does political

culture "resolve the fundamental problem of relationship
between the political culture and the political system.
While political culture may explain incremental change
within the state it lacks an explanation for revolutionary
change. Moreover as James Bill and Robert Hardgrave suggest,

"its focus is almost wholly on the 'input' side of the
political system^— on the determinants of political behavior

rather than on political behavior as such,"^®

CONCLUSION

This paper has traced the origins of colonialism and
demonstrated its legacy which continues to impact current

state relationships. As mentioned, the author finds no

significant differences between the terms colonialism and

imperialism. Colonialism implies the domination of one
society over another for the purposes of territorial and

economic gain. As a corollary, imperialism can be described
as the tools used by colonialists to implement their
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objectives. Although, some scholars may wish to argue that

neo-imperialism is separate and distinct frOm colonialism,
I contend, that for the most part, the precepts of

colonialism still continue to operate within this system.
The ideological expressions of colonialism were

rationalized and operationalized in Realism. Realists
concern themselves with the distribution of power. They
argue that national interest is national power and
conversely, national power is buttressed by acquisition

of interests. Accordingly, Realists argue that men are

motivated by self interests which continually change and
are reflected in state foreign policy. Goncomitantly,

politics is divided into domestic and interna.tional spheres
each separate and distinct from the other, both in terms

of morals and economics. Thus, realists hold any affirmation
of universal morality and its relationship to international

relations as spurious. In fact, the only "good" policy
is one which insures the survivability of the state.
I have offered an alternative view to Realist paradigm.

Transnationalism is not a radical departure, but rather,
a continuation of theory based on world interdependence.
As discussed, Transnationalism contends, that the world
is more complex than states being driven by the need for

national security. Besides the military, diplomats and
official policy makers, other non-state actors also

influence the internatiohal polity. Transnationalists argue
>,.101 ■.

tliat international relations are becoming 'increasingly

more integrated and that political and economic powers

are merging into supranationational entities. Although
this process is slow, multilayered, and grows by spurts
it is continual.

Finally, Transnationalism is a viable alternative
because it is flexible, culture sensitive, combines politics
and economics, and accurately depicts the contemporary

political setting.
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